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ABSTRACT
This paper describes the original and subsequent designs of the Solid Rocket
Booster/Holddown Post blast shield assemblies and their associated hardware. It
presents the major problems encountered during their early use in the Space
Shuttle Program, during the Return-to-Flight Modification Phase, and during their
fabrication and validation testing phases.
The actions taken to correct the problems are discussed, along with the
various concepts now being considered to increase the useful life of the blast shield.
INTRODUCTION
The exhaust plume of the SRB's used during Space Shuttle launches
consists of hot gases and aluminum oxide particles and has the effect of a huge
sandblaster. Launch hardware such as the Holddown Post System, which serves
as a support stand and restrains the Space Shuttle System during Space Shuttle
main engine thrust buildup, sustains extensive damage during launch. If
unprotected, the Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) aft skirt shoes and their mating
spherical bearings are rendered useless after each launch and must be scrapped.
Then there were blast shields ....
The blast shield was conceived to prevent loss of launch hardware. In fact,
current launch hardware cost comparisons estimate that the use of at least four
blast shields saves the program approximately $250,000 per launch.
The blast shield is a mechanism that is attached to the holddown post with
mount brackets which also act as hinges (see figure 1). The shield rests against
the fragment catcher of the frangible nut prior to launch. It is spring loaded, and
during lift-off of the Space Shuttle, the front edge (skid plate) "cams off" the
fragment catcher. This action increases the spring tension which causes the blast
shields to close after separation from the SRB aft skirt. As its name implies, it
shields the shoe, the top of the hoiddown post, and the spherical bearing from the
hostile environment of the SRB's exhaust plume.
Because of the northerly drift angle of the Space Shuttle during lift-off, the
north holddown posts (numbers 3, 4, 7, and 8) sustain the majority of the blast
damage. Consequently, blast shields are installed only on these posts (see figure
2).
ORIGINAL DESIGN
The original design of the blast shield consists of the following major
components:
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a. Hood. The hood is of hip-roof-shaped construction and is made of ASTM
A36 steel plates. It has longitudinal and lateral stiffeners. The hood also
has two hinge clevis mounts incorporated with the longitudinal stiffeners.
The plates are pre-drilled for the hinge shaft. The hood of the blast
shield closes over the holddown post to protect it and its associated
hardware from launch blast.
b. _. Latch assemblies are located inside the clevis mounts and above
the hinge shaft (left and right side). They preyent the hood from
reopening due to back pressure of the exhaust blast. The latches are
spring loaded so that pressure is applied towards the hinge brackets as
the hood closes.
C,
_Hinge Shaft. The hinge shaft is made from A STM A490 bolt material and
supports the hood and the main torsion springs that close the hood.
Spring stops are installed on both ends of the shaft.
d. a__Lh.a_E_Lo_c__k_inP g_Rj_. The shaft locking pins (two per blast shield) are
made of drill rod material. These pins lock the shaft to the mount
brackets after the springs have been armed. The pins are inserted
through holes in the mount brackets, which are positioned at 45
degrees. The top ends of the pins protrude out of the mount brackets by
25 millimeters (1 inch) and are held in place by cotter pins.
e. _r__a_c__k_. The mount brackets are weldments (two per blast
shield) made from ASTM A514 steel that are bolted to the holddown post
on the side away from the SRB's. They are used to attach the blast
shield to the holddown post, and also serve as hinges.
f. __M_£nTorsion_ Spd_n_gs. The torsion springs (two each) are made from
ASTM A229 music wire and provide the energy to close the blast shield.
One leg is longer than the other. The longer leg is turned 10 degrees
from the para!le ! axi s. _ .......
g. Skid Plate. The skid plate is mounted on the front edge of the blast
shield with three hex head cap screws and contacts both the fragment
catcher and the SRB aft skirt, which are made of!nconel and aluminum,
respectively. It serves as a buffer between the fragment catcher and the
SRB aft skirt and, to prevent contact damage, is made of 5086-H32
aluminum plafe_ _
h. _S_pring__ops_. The spring stops are made of ASTM A36 steel and are
located near the ends of the hinge shaft. They are L-shaped and are
held in position by flats on the shaft ends and by spring pins.
i. h___ft _UppO_. The shaft support lugs are located on each side of
the blast shield near the shaft ends. They support the shaft in case of
excessive bending loads and provide an attachment point for the spring
arming tool and shaft blast covers.
The lugs are made of ASTM A36 steel plate which is welded to the side
of the blast shield in the vertical position. A hole at the bottom
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accommodates the shaft ends. Two tapped holes located just above the
shaft hole serve as attachment points for the arming tool and the shaft
blast covers.
Shaft Blast Covers. Also made from ASTM A36 steel, the shaft blast
covers protect the shaft ends. They are attached to the shaft support
lugs with two self-locking screws.
PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE ORIGINAL DESIGN
The early versions of the blast shields failed to close during two launches
prior to Space Transportation System (STS) mission 33 (51-L) (Challenger). These
failures resulted in debris and raised concerns that the debris could become
projectiles and damage flight hardware. For example:
a. On STS-26, launched July 29, 1985, post-launch inspection revealed "all
blast shields came down; Blast shield on post #3 was slow in closing;
skid plate missing; spherical bearing and shoe damaged; underside of
blast shield has bad erosion damage .... "
b. On STS-31, launched November 26, 1985, "Blast shields on post #'s 4
and 8 did not close. They were standing open at approximately 80 deg.
after launch. All hardware was intact with no missing debris (parts).
Shoes and bearings were eroded .... "
The used blast shields were stored in several areas at the John F. Kennedy
Space Center (KSC) and photographed for record purposes. Usingthese photos
and reports published by blast shield inspection teams, areas of debris concern
were identified. Specifically, in the failed-open blast shield condition, the following
components are exposed to direct blast impingement with the following observed
effects:
a. Shaft Locking P_. The protruding part of the shaft locking pin was
exposed to direct blast impingement. The cotter pins could not be
located and are suspected of being vaporized or pulverized. The pins
can easily slide back out of the mounting brackets and become
projectiles.
b. Main__T__Qr__Q_n$_l_rings_. The sandblasting effect of the SRB's has been
observed to ablate the exposed (top) portion of the springs by more than
13 millimeters (0.50 inch), leaving 28 partial (horseshoe shaped) rings
hanging on the main shaft.
C. Skid Plate_. The aluminum skid plate could not be located and is
suspected of being vaporized or possible pulverized by the sandblasting
effect of the SRB exhaust.
d. Spring Stops. The spring stops became debris.
e. Shaft Suppo Lrt____gs. None of the lugs ever detached from the blast
shield during launch. However, in at least one post-launch inspection,
some lugs were reported to be "barely hanging on to the blast shield."
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Further, some of them could be detached manually from the blast shield
without any effort.
fl ,Shaft Blast Covers. Although the shaft blast covers adequately protect
the shaft ends, and have qot _een observed tosustain launch damage,
they could become launch debris for the following_onS:
(1) They are attached to the shaft support lugs.
I
(2) They are outside the blast shield's envelope; therefore, they are
fully exposed to the exhaust blast.
PRE STS-33 (51-L) MODIFICATION PHASE
=. _ L :
Prior to the STS-33 mission, launched January 28, 1986, the blast shields
were modified to ensure proper closure during launch, thereby reducing the
possibility of blast shield Pa_s becoming debris.
The major problems associated with the original design were weak main
springs due to a low factor of safety on yield strength and the re!axation of the main
springs, probably due to heat soak. In December 1985, the NASA KSC Design
Support Contractor was directed to design a "kick spring" mechanism to aid the blast
shield in closing during launch. The mechanism's design consisted primarily of a
plunger, a compression spring, a housing, and 6-millimeter (0.25-inch) diameter
retaining cables. The assembly was mounted between the mounting brackets
behind the blast shield. The working principle was as follows: At some point during
lift-off, the blast shield is intended to engage the plunger, which compresses the
spring. As the aft skirt leaves the blast shield, the plunger provides the "extra kick"
to close the blast shield. The rationale" The faster the blast shield closes, the less
chance that debris will be generated.
POST sTs-33 (51-L) FINDINGS
The post-launch report of STS-33 revealed that all blast shields closed
normally with no damage to shoes and bearings. But the newly installed kick
springs did not fare so well: The plungers, the springs, and their restraint cables
were missing on all four holddown posts. One kick spring was found on the fiat
haunch of holddown post number 1, which is on the opposite side of holddown post
number 3 (see figure 2). Two plungers were found at the north perimeter fence,
approximately 400 meters (1/4 mile) away from the holddown post sitel The cables
were never found. These discoveries led to speculation that the kick spdngs may
have contributed to the Challenger tragedy.
In a National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) investigation
report submitted in February 1986, the following facts were considered:
o The SRB plume flame is approximately 178 meters (600 feet) long.
o Two plungers were found at the north perimeter fence.
O The end cap was in place on one of the plungers, permitting metallurgical
analysis. Analysis of an end cap indicated 0.30-miillimeter (0.012-inch)
buildup of aluminum oxide around the sides.
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A full-duration exposure to flame will deposit approximately 0.74 mm
(0.029 in.) coating.
Therefore, 0.30 millimeter (0.012 inch)/0.74 millimeter (0.029 inch) ---
41 -percent exposure.
o Estimated height, h = 0.41 x 178 meters (600 feet) = 73 meters (246 feet).
O A preliminary assessment stated that the plungers came off after the
vehicle was 200 to 300 feet up. Plungers were blown into the SRB flame
trench and out to the perimeter fence.
A Film Analysis Report dated March 10, 1986, stated that, "The relatively
short dwell time and rapid closure rate observed on all four blast shields suggests
that the kick springs were in place and working until sometime after closure.
However this cannot be confirmed by direct observation." Closures could not be
determined due to flame obscuration. The report further stated that no direct
impingement of SRB flame was evident in the vicinity of the kick springs throughout
the observational interval (approximately 1.120 seconds), indicating that the cable
restraints were still intact.
On the other hand, based on the known drift characteristics of the launch
vehicle, it is probable that direct SRB flame impingement was of sufficient
magnitude to burn off the cables after 1.120 seconds.
Both reports concluded that the kick spring assembly did not contribute to the
Challenger tragedy. The incident did, however, increase concerns regarding
holddown post and blast shield debris.
POST 51-L MODIFICATION (RETURN-TO-FLIGHT) PHASE
Between January 1987 and September 1988, the blast shield underwent an
extensive modification program. Once again, the pdmary concern was
strengthening the areas of the design contributing to the release of debris. Thus,
redesign efforts focused on ensuring proper closure of the blast shields, eliminating
the kick spring/plunger mechanism that proved so susceptible to launch blast, and
modifying the design wherever possible to minimize blast impingement.
Accordingly, the blast shields were modified as follows (see figure 3):
a. Hood.
(1) The hinge clevises were opened up to prevent the hood from
binding with the mounting brackets.
(2) The clevis hole diameter was increased and line bored to allow
more clearance between the shaft and the holes.
(3) The latch shaft holes were enlarged to ensure proper operation of
the latches and to preclude binding.
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(4) The spring stop plates welded to the blast shield were properly
located from the centerline of the main shaft to ensure that the
springs engage the blast shield at the proper angles given the
allowable tolerances.
b. 8haft Locking_. To eliminate the exposed cotter pins that held the
locking pins in place, a new shaft locking pin was designed with a
threaded end at the bottom. It was also shortened so that no part would
be exposed to the exhaust blast.
c. Mount Bracket. The hinge holes in the original brackets did not align
properly when mounted on the holddown post. This anomaly was
concluded to be a contributing factor to blast shield failures because the
shaft was binding with the hinge holes. Also, the addition of the spring
blast covers reduced the clearance between the SRB shoes and the
blast shield. Using the old brackets would have required the addition of
shim plate s between the holddown post and the brackets.
New one-piece bracket weidments made of AISI 4140 and heat treated
to 1,034,000 kPa (150 ksi) to 1,241,000 kPa (180 ksi) were fabricated.
The shim plate thickness was incorporated into the baseplate. The hinge
holes on the vertical mounts were line bored.
z
d. M__aLnTorsion Springs. To minimize debris, the main torsion spring
envelope was reduced to allow full enclosure of the springs. Specifically,
the mean outside coil diameter of the main torsion spring was reduced
along with the number of coils.
Since the main torsion springs were suspected to be the major
contributor to the blast shield's failure to close, they were modified
further. The rationale for failure: Their constant exposure to high
temperatures coupled with their prolonged pre-armed condition weakens
them. Consequently, the main torsion springs were redesigned using
ASTM A407 spring wire and increasingthewirediameter. The ASTM
A407 spring wire has a higher tensile strength than the original ASTM
A229 music wire: 1,550,000 kPa (225 ksi) versus 1,350,000 kPa (196
ksi), resulting in a higher factor of safety on yield, namely, 1.70 versus
1.0I.
However, several concerns are inherent with the use of the new
material. For example, KSC design specifications require a minimum
factor of safety of 2 to 1. They further specify that no material used in
Ground Support Equipment (GSE) shall have an ultimate tensile strength
exceedin._ 1,241,000 kPa (180 ksi). The new material violated both
specifications.
The concerns here were very real. The high tensile strength results in
susceptibility to Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC). These springs can
stay on the launch pads for weeks in the armed (pre-loaded) position.
The humid, salty atmosphere at KSC coupled with the loaded condition
of the springs can hasten the effects of stress corrosion cracking.
!
i
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On the other hand, the original springs had a very low factor of safety on
yield (1.01) and were clearly inadequate for use on the blast shields, as
evidenced by their failures. Designing springs with a factor of safety on
yield of 2 would have required a bigger spring or the use of a higher
strength material. Due to the limitations of the existing spring envelope,
a bigger spring would have required a total redesign of the blast shields.
Increasing the ultimate strength was equally unacceptable due to the
increasedchance of failure due to SCC.
Consequently, a waiver was obtained to allow the use of the new spring
design with a factor of safety on yield of less than 2 and an ultimate
tensile strength exceeding 1,241,000 kPa (180 ksi).
Interestingly, the use of square wire springs was considered. The
section properties of a square wire spring increase the factor of safety
and the strength, which would have eliminated the use of kick springs
and/or additional springs while allowing a smaller spring envelope.
Because it is not available as an off-the-shelf item and because of its
relatively high cost, however, the use of square wire springs was rejected.
Therefore, the round wire springs were selected for use with the
provision that they only be usedfor one launch. This policy was
implemented to avoid failure due to heat soak or SCC caused by
repeated use.
Center Torsion Springs. The kick spring assembly was replaced with
center torsion springs made from AISI 5160 steel. Although the
preferred choice was ASTM A401 steel wire, it was not available in 17.5
millimeters (0.69 inch) diameter. Two springs were installed in the
middle section of the hinge or main shaft between the mounting
clevises. The initial blast shield position is at 47 degrees; it engages the
center torsion springs at approximately 67 to 70 degrees during lift-off.
The advantages of this design over the original design are that it consists
of one-piece construction, it is easier to install, and it has a higher factor
of safety (greater than 2 to 1 on yield).
Spring_Blast Cover Plates. ASTM A36 steel plate spring blast covers
were added for both the outboard and center torsion springs to prevent
blast impingement. The blast cover plates were welded to the blast
shield weldment. The outboard springs (or main springs) were fully
encased while the center springs were provided with a bent plate for
exhaust blast protection in case of blast shield failure in the open
position. The center springs could not be fully enclosed due to the
design of the spring stop.
Skid Plate. The basic profile of the skid plate was retained; however, the
method of mounting changed. The original aluminum skid plate was
mounted with three hex head bolts located on the front edge of the blast
shield and was directly exposed to the exhaust blast. Two mounting
plates were added to the modified skid plates to allow them to be bolted
from the sides of the two longitudinal stiffeners, affording protection from
direct exhaust blast impingement.
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Although aluminum was used in the original design, post-launch
inspections of blast shields soon revealed that aluminum components
become debris. If the blast shields were to fail in the open position, the
retaining bolts and the skid plate itself could be eroded and blasted away
during launch. The concerns of skid plate damage to the SRB aft skirt
and the fragment catcher, when weighed against the debris concerns
associated with aluminum, left only one choice: The aluminum skid
plates were replaced with steel skid plates.
h. Spring SLoops. Because of the increased loads and change in dimensions
of the new main springs, the spring stops were changed to AISI 4140.
They were also tapered to provide clearance for the spring legs.
E_]_8_ff_fJpp_Q_d_Lug_s___ndShaft End Blast Covers. The designs of the
shaft support lugs and shaft end blast covers were simplified. The lugs
were replaced with a spacer plate welded to the blast shield roof just
above the shaft ends. The end cover plates were fabricated from steel
plate and mounted with five socket head screws, the heads of which are
recessed into the plate. These modifications streamlined the design of
the blast shield by enclosing the end cover plates within the blast shield
envelope: - ....
VALIDATION TESTING
The exhaust plume of the SRB strikes the holddown post at T+1.6 seconds
from SRB ignition. Consequently, one of the design requirements of the blast
shield is that it must be in the closed position before the exhaust plume strikes the
holddown post. Analysis predicted that, based on the center of gravity location, the
drift angle of the Shuttle lift-off, the spring torque, and the surrounding pressure
[1,034 kPa (150 psi)], the blast shield should close in 950 milliseconds. Because of
recent modifications, and to verify analysis, testing and qualification were required
for each blast sh_e[d_ _-:_ _ _ _: :_:_;
Testin_ was conducted at KSC's Launch Equipment Test Facility (LETF) and
consisted primarily of mounting the blast shield on a holddown post with the SRB
shoe and spherical bearing installed. The blast shield was initially opened to a
47-degree angle, then wire rope cables and drop weights were attached to the blast
shield. The weights were released using gaseous nitrogen (GN2) nuts. Release of
the drop weights pulls the blast shield to its maximum opening angle (80 tO 81
degrees) thereby simulating SRB lift-off (see figure 4). At the full-open point, the
blast shield is released from the drop weight to close back onto the SRB shoe.
Time is measured from the moment the drop weight is released to the moment the
blast shield closes, resting on the SRB shoe.
This method of testing, however, did not accurately depict Shuttle lift-off. The
release timing of the GN2 nuts varied somewhat, and the wire rope cables had a
tendency to snag in the sheaves/pulleys during the closing cycle, thus delaying
closure time. -
Therefore, a Lift Off Simulator (LOS) Test Fixture was designed and built to
more accurately simulate that period of time during lift-off when the blast shields
are in contact with the SRB aft skirts (see figure 5). The fixture consists of the
following major components/assemblies:
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a. Winch and Cable System. A dropweight-operated winch-and-cable
system is used to lift the aft skirt assembly, thereby simulating lift-off.
b. Holddown Po_s_tAssembly. The original LOS used an actual holddown
post assembly, shoe, and spherical bearings. Although actual shoes and
spherical bearings are still used, because of its relative scarcity, the
holddown post has since been replaced with a facsimile.
c. DrQp_WeighLs_. The drop weights and aft skirt assembly weight are set at
a ratio to simulate 0.55 g lift-off acceleration.
d. GN2 Release Nuts. The drop weights are released by GN2 nuts.
e. AffSkirt Assembly. In the aft skirt assembly, an actual support column
and, because of its relatively high cost, a facsimile of the fragment
catcher are used. The aft skirt assemblyguide rails were set at 17
degrees from the vertical to simulate the drift angle during Shuttle lift-off.
Since then, the drift angle has been revised to 13.5 degrees.
f. Instrumentation. The instrumentation system consists of the following
components:
(1) An accelerometer mounted on the blast shield for event tracking.
(2) An electrical break switch mounted on the simulator guide panels
for start time event signal.
(3) An electrical crush switch mounted on the shoe for blast shield
closure event signal.
(4) A Linear Voltage Displacement Transducer (LVDT) or fishreel for
data plots of displacement versus time.
(5) Three high-speed cameras (located at the front, back, and side of
the LOS).
g. Blast Shield. The actual blast shield being tested is mounted on the
holddown post to rest on the aft skirt section.
The LOS was first used to validate the blast shields used in the STS-26R
(Return-To-Flight) mission. The Interactive Laboratory System (ILS) indicated, in
its observation of the LOS performance, that the LOS was rising at 0.60 g, faster
than the 0.55-g acceleration indicated by camera data. The discrepancy was
attributed to errors in reading the defined start times - the time is read from the ILS
plots (instrumentation errors) then compared with camera data (viewing angle
errors). However, since the discrepancy was negligible, data collected from blast
shield drops were considered acceptable.
The first set of blast shields was then tested on the newly designed and built
LOS. The results verified analysis data; specifically, the closure times averaged
about 800 milliseconds and no interferences were encountered.
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RETURN-TO-FLIGHT MODIFICATION PHASE COMPLICATIONS
Several problems were encountered during the Return-to-Flight blast shield
modification program. For example:
a. Blast Shield Fabrication. The ten blast shields being modified were
existing blast shields that had neyer been used for launch. These blast
shields were measured and compared with the existing drawings, with an
alarming discovery- No two blast shields were built the same, not one of
the blast shields was built per the drawings, andthe measurements
taken exceeded allowable tolerancesl Thus, the factor of quality control
during fabrication entered the picture.
Not much could be done about the differences in the dimensions of these
blast shields, and few avenues existed to reduce the possibility of
binding. Specifically:
(1) The hinge shaft holes were line bored to a larger diameter.
(2) Bushings then were press fitted in the enlarged holes then the
bushings were line bored to the proper diameter with the correct
amount of tolerance.
(3) The clevis areas were widened by milling off about 1/8 inch from
each side. The smallest gap a|lowed between the mount bracket
and the clevis was 4.3 millimeters (o.iT:Jnch).
b. Mount Brackets. The vertical portion of the mounting brackets interfered
with the mating blast shields. Opening up the clevis mount of the blast
shield eliminated the interference. This problem was just one of many
which have resulted in the trial-and-error evolution of the mount brackets
(see figure 6). Specifically, the brackets used during the 60-percent and
90-percent design phase were weldments. A fillet weld at the lower
baseplate of the brackets was ground to provide room for the mounting
bolts.
The blast shield then underwent validation testing at KSC's Launch
Equipment Test Facility (LETF). After testing, the blast shield was
removed from the holddown post that was used as a test stand. One of
the bottom base plates fell off.., under a no-load condition! The cause
was determined to be lack of weld fusion: a fillet weld was used instead
of a bevel weld, as called for in the drawings. Grinding the fillet weld left
about a 1.5-millimeter (0.06-inch) weld holding the foot to the vertical
bracket. Additionally, several problems were associated with the use of
welded 4140 parts, including a lack of established procedures and a lack
of welders experienced in welding 4140 steel.
As a result, the mount brackets were made out of a one-piece AISI 4140
steel billet. The billet was rough cut to a basic shape then machined to
its final form in the annealed condition. Heat treatment and magnetic
particle inspection followed machining.
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More recently, the use of casting was adopted to reduce fabrication
costs. The first article casting was made and passed X-ray and magnetic
particle testing. A second batch of four was then poured at the foundry.
During the machining phase, the machinists observed that the second
batch machined harder than the first article. After machining, the
brackets were sent out for heat treatment. The brackets came back from
heat treatment with large cracks, typically near the heavy sections of the
brackets.
An analysis performed by the KSC Analysis Laboratory revealed that the
cracks were caused by a higher than allowable carbon and manganese
content in the alloy. The foundry's computer printout indicated
otherwise. A second analysis performed by the foundry, however,
confirmed the KSC findings.
A subsequent investigation revealed that quality control personnel had
not taken samples of the second pour. Later, they took samples from
another pour which happened to have the proper alloy composition
required for the brackets. Unfortunately, the alloy used for the
unsampled pour, the alloy that was used for the brackets, was not the
correct composition.
Again, the design process had been complicated by inadequate quality
control during fabrication and manufacturing.
_LkLd__P_la_a_t_.The skid plate could not be mounted because of interference
with mounting lugs. Moreover, the mounting holes did not line up. As a
result, each skid plate was individually modified to fit its corresponding
blast shield.
Shaft Interference. The main shafts interfered with the end cover plates
in some blast shields. The shafts were not made to print; they were
longer than what was called for in the drawings. Consequently, the
shafts had to be remachined to proper dimensions and the end cover
plates had to be shimmed. The ends of the shafts were also heavily
lubricated prior to installation.
Main and Center Torsion Springs. The springs were cold formed and
heat treated as specified. One of the main problems encountered in the
manufacturing process was maintaining the required spring leg angles.
The allowable tolerance forthe leg angels is +/-1 degree. The spring
manufacturer normally holds a +/-5 degree tolerance. However, due to
the criticality of the engagement angle between the blast shield and
springs, a +/-5 degree tolerance was not acceptable. To compensate,
the test conductor determines how many shims are required so that the
springs engage the blast shield at the proper angles during validation
and acceptance testing.
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CURRENT PROBLEMS
Since STS-26R, no failures have OccUrred: As of this writing, all the blast
shields used have closed. Debris is negligible. However, several problems still
must be addi'essed:
a. The blast shield survives only two launches. After the second launch,
the hood's top surface is badly eroded. In several cases, burnthrough
has been observed requiring that these blast shield assemblies be
scrapped and replaced with new ones.
b. The provision that the springs must be replaced after each launch has
proven costly.
C. The addition of 19-millimeter (0.75-inch) shims to the baseplate of the
mount bracket moved the blast shield hood, slightly exposing the front
edge of the SRB shoe to exhaust blast. This exposure results in SRB
shoe erosion during some launches.
d. A lack of quality control is still evident in the fabrication process of the
blast shields; specifically, fabricators are unable to hold the required
dimensional tolerances.
CONCLUSION .....
_L ..
Several improvements are still required to optimize blast shield operation.
Some of them, being implemented as of this writing, are: _
a.
b.
Scrapping the entire blast shield assembly after the second use is not
economical. Some parts of the assembly, including the mounting
brackets, the main shaft, the spring stops, the latches, _ndthe shaft end
cover plates are not directly exposed to the S-R-Bexha-ust plume and ca--n
still be used for at least four or five launches. Basically, only the hood
and the springs require replacement. However, cannibalization of Ground
Support Equipment designated as scrap is not allowed at KSC.
The economics of cannibalization has been presented to Logistics
engineers at KSC, resulting in the implementation of a new procedure
allowing cannibalization fQr the re!urbjshment of blast shie!ds that have
been used for two launches. To date, the savings realized in the cost of
refurbishing versus fabricating new blast shield assemblies has been
approximately 35 to 40 percent.
The cost of machining the bracket from a steel billet is expensive.
Economically, a casting is a less expensive approach. Less machining is
involved and, consequently, a reduced possibility of failure due to human
error in machining.
c. Further analysis and testing are required to determine if the springs can
be used for more than one launch.
d. A redesign of the hood is being considered, includingpossible
replacement of the welded hood with a casting and thickening of the top
plates to allow more use out of each assembly. Another alternative
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is the use of a bolt-on-type sacrificial plate. The plate would allow easy
replacement after burnthrough has occurred.
Quality control is being strongly emphasized. Space Shuttle flights
involve human lives and expensive hardware and payloads. Ablast
shield failure could be catastrophic. Quality control, particularly during
the fabrication process, must be emphasized. Engineers and designers
can incorporate numerous factors of safety within their designs, but if
they begin with defective products, the efforts of the design process can
be negated.
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